Words and Deeds
Interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki
Małgorzata Dzieduszycka: You reacted to the question as to whether a comparison between the nationalist ideology of the conflicting parties in former Yugoslavia and German facism can be justified. Why was that?
Tadeusz Mazowiecki: I shall not deny the fact that in political analysis certain comparisons are necessary. They can even be creative but what I keep remembering is my own viewpoint at the time I was rapporteur of the Committee of Human Rights at the United Nations.
At that time a number of people whose viewpoints were close to mine and were democratic ones used and continue to use the word 'facism' when referring to some phenomena occuring in that area. The reason I reacted is that as rapporteur of the Committee of Human Rights I came across very strong utterances by the conflicting parties. They employed words such as 'facism', 'genocide,' and each side expected me to use these same words with regard to the opponent. I reacted against this not because I believed there were no elements of facism or genocide in the conflict but because I did not want my words to aggravate the conflict nor to shut off any possibility of solving it.
And this continues to be a problem for me. I do not mean to say that such things do not happen but I do mean that the conflict arises out of many composite factors. We must remember that as far as Bosnia is concerned we have to consider not only the aggression against it but also its own civil war.
M. Dzieduszycka: Our comparisons are based mostly on the aggressive language of propaganda; a language that was employed in nazi Germany, which is used today by certain fundamentalists. It is used wherever institutional violence is to be found. Hence the enormous responsibility that is borne by the media. Do you believe that journalists have influenced developments in the yougoslav conflict?
T. Mazowiecki: They did, of course. We must however draw a line between foreign correspondents who were on site and the local media existing in the conflicting areas. And even among those some differences should be defined. As far as international media are concerned I believe that their influence was extremely positive. They were able to reveal the extent of the crimes committed far sooner than international organizations did. When I became rapporteur in August '92 I found that media revealed the existence of concentration camps much earlier than international organisations found out about them. Incidentally, while holding this office I cooperated with the media much to the surprise of the UN officials. In my opinion the reports I prepared were not intended merely for national representatives or diplomats. They were intended for the public at large. It was therefore important for me to cooperate with the press and I used to help them to the extent possible. I was not successful in my efforts for lack of legal or practical conditions to give them full protection whenever they worked with me. Actually even I did not have satisfactory protection: anyone willing to break through could have done so.
I therefore consider that the role of international media is extremely positive: in the first place they revealed the truth and secondly they caused public opinion to rebel against worldwide indifference. They exercised pressure on politicians.
One can easily recognise the influence of public opinion upon international leaders, mostly American but European as well, when they were finally forced to act. The most influential nations in the world were compelled to act in a more decisive fashion and forget about washing their hands of the whole thing. I recall the important part played by the media when compared to that of the so called politics of accomplished facts.
As far as local media are concerned, they had a very detrimental influence not only in Bosnia itself but in Serbia, the so-called new-Yugoslavia, but also in Croatia. Of course there were exceptions to this rule and these would deserve to be analysed in detail. Actually one of my reports concerned the media and you can consult it any time.
M. Dzieduszycka: What did this negative influence consist of?
T. Mazowiecki: Most of the time they showed a negative picture of the oponent; they stood by negative stereotypes like for instance referring to Serbs as 'czetniks', calling Croats 'ustashiks', and speaking about Bosnian muslims as extremist fundamentalists.
Conflict was fostered by small and different local publications that literally named those who were to be "nailed down". I was witness to such events.
On the other hand not all of the media were like this. Where Serbia is concerned for a certain time there was an independent TV station at Belgrade and the 'B92' independent broadcasting station. Both played a very positive role that unfortunately was restricted to Belgrade. I have the highest opinion about the role played by the 'Oslobodjenie' daily in Sarajevo. Not all was bad in the Croat press either. What they had in common was unfortunately a negative stereotype of the enemy and I think that after Dayton they sobered up and accepted some changes that were alas insufficient.
M. Dzieduszycka: What, in your opinion, is the role of the Church?
T. Mazowiecki: In this domain we can also detect positive and negative phenomena. At local level I was able to witness the extent of cooperation between the catholic clergy and the muslim. I know that Cardinal Kuharic played a positive and prominent part at Zagreb. He prayed for everyone, not only for Croats. Many positive events took place but there were many negative ones as well. Among the latter I would say that hierarchies paid too much importance to their own confessions and that Churches, especially the Orthodox Church, were identified with the national viewpoint, namely the Serb one. In the Croat region of Bosnia similar phenomena were present. Hence we conclude that the part played by the Church was inadequate. I hope that this trend will change. I found myself in Sarajevo at the same time the Pope paid his visit there. He addressed everyone, he tried to speak to everyone, he tried to meet with everyone and thus raised hopes that Churches in Bosnia would join forces and work together. Considering the situation still prevailing in that area this is of utmost importance.
M. Dzieduszycka: Given the time lapsed how do you assess the attempts to settle the conflict? Whas there anything that should have been done and was never carried out?
T. Mazowiecki: In my reports I always said that a more decisive action at the outset of the conflict might have avoided further warfare. Had actions carried out in autumn '95 been undertaken 3 years earlier this aim would have been achieved. What was feared was a conflict similar to what had happened with Vietnam. The Americans were particularly fearful. In my opinion politics that the situation required where never applied. We should have had politics bordering interventionism so that a threat would have been recognized for a fact, especially by the Serbs.
M. Dzieduszycka: After you resigned did you ever feel that you had made a mistake?
T. Mazowiecki: I made no mistake. Under these circumstances I raised a voice of protest against politics that approved accomplished facts. It was the only thing I was able to do. The only way I could help.
M. Dzieduszycka: Thank you very much.
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