Natasza Pejic, a commentary.

In his article, "The Balkan Syndrome: Nationalism and the media", Jan Pieklo rightfully points out that the war in former Yugoslavia broke-out because it was easier to create national dictatorships than a stable democracy on the ruins of a communist system. However, the fundamental question seems to be whether the war could have been avoided and how. What was the alternative to the flare-up of the various suppressed nationalims, orchastrated by those national leaders who saw them as a means to power in the void created on the ruins of a joint communist system?

The issue of how can a communist system in a multiethnic country be transformed into a democracy is a pressing one for the countries of East- Central Europe, since, as Pieklo points out, that part of the world is also heavily burdened with unresolved ethnic relations.

However, in order to truly conclude the war, the new states created on the territory of former Yugoslavia must yet answer this question.

As the renowned professor and publicist Mihajlo Mihajlov put it in an article in the weekend edition of the Belgrade independent daily Nasa Borba of Sep. 13 - 14, what is really worrying in today's Serbia (and the rest of former Yugoslavia) is that there is no willingness, (even on part of the opposition) to ponder deeper, beyond the sphere of current political pragmatism and seek ideas which could lead to a way out of the dark tunnel and to fundamental change in the troubled Balkans.

As Mihajlov points out, 30 percent of the population of the new Yugoslavia - FRY is non- Serb and until relations between the majority nation and the national minorities are resolved in a satisfactory way there will be no stability or even peace in the country. Practically half a million Serbs were in one way or another exiled from Croatia during the war, and until it opens its doors to them and grants them their rights, Croatia cannot aspire to be a democracy. Before the FRY and Croatia democratize, there is no hope for Bosnia.

The peoples of former Yugoslavia choose national dictatorships and thus, inevitably war, as a "safe way" out of democratic transition. But now, six years later, transition is the only alternative to the war that is, in fact, still being waged on these territories. What is very disconcerting, however, is that the forces opposed to change are still much more dominant.

Jan Pieklo's article "The Balkan Syndrome: Nationalism and the Media" reveals a very rare, profound knowledge of the Yugoslav crisis and the subsequent war. It analyzes one of the most generally relevant problems that that war has brought to surface, namely the role of contemporary media in national conflicts. By now, its a well known fact that the first bullet fired in former Yugoslavia did not come from a gun but from a pen. The language of hate became predominant in state controlled media in Serbia in 1987. The killing began in 1991. The Kosovo Albanian's were the first target of the hate speech, in no time, a media war flared between the nations of former Yugoslavia. The majority of journalists willingly submitted to being instruments in the conscious, political production of enemies and the building up of a state of paranoid frenzy among the country's various nations. The lies that were published, which prepared the groundwork for war, surpass any stretch of the imagination.

Given that the war in former Yugoslavia revealed to the fullest the horrifying aspect of the power of contemporary media, or, more precisely, their control, its experience raises the issue of the moral responsibility of journalists. Can they be held accountable, to what extent and how? What is the difference between preparing the groundwork for a war crime and actually committing it? One thing is certain: the latter cannot be done without the former. (I would just like to add that one should not complacently rule out the possibility of the press in a western democracy being manipulated for political purposes).

Pieklo also singles out the flaws of the western media coverage of the Balkan conflict, which led to it being yet an additional destabilizing factor. Of the errors he holds western journalists accountable for, two - oversimplification and ignorance, which are, in fact inseparable, weigh most heavily.

The painting of an oversimplified picture of the roots of the problem, with the Serbs being the only "villains" definitely fueled the conflict, as Pieklo points out, and also played into the hands of certain international political interests. This is by no means to deny that the Serbs as the largest nation, with the most fire power, had the greatest responsibility for the future of the country, but only to stress that the complexity of the problem could, by no means, be grasped within such a simple framework. In fact, ignorance of the history of the country prevented most western journalists from understanding the historical aspect of the genesis of the conflict.

The "War in Slovenia" was a telling example of how the western journalists allowed themselves to be used for political purposes. The six day war in Slovenia, which began on June 27, 1991, and which was an introduction into the subsequent horrors in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was portrayed by the western media as the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) terrible aggression on the tiny, freedom loving Republic of Slovenia. Both Slovenia and Croatia had unilaterally declared independence from former Yugoslavia (SFRY) two days beforehand, on June 25, 1991. Western journalists put themselves in the service of Slovenian propaganda by presenting the JNA as a giant bully out to destroy the unarmed Slovenian citizens. This image and interpretation of what was going on in Slovenia at the time, which reached every corner of the globe, was to a great extent responsible for the premature international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, before any of the tremendous problems that such a move entailed were resolved. According to official figures, 49 people were killed during the six day war. Most of them were 18 year old JNA soldiers, including Slovenian ones. According to all relevant subsequent testimonies, the presidents of Slovenia and Serbia at the time, Milan Kucan and Slobodan Milosevic, had made a deal that Slovenia could leave the joint state at no price, on condition that it does not interfere into what happens to the rest of the country. The JNA, comprised mostly of 18 year olds, was sent to Slovenia with no clear orders. It was, in fact, the greatest victim of the six day war. From this historical distance it seems that the true purpose of the deployment of additional JNA troops to Slovenia at the time was for the joint, federal army, comprised all Yugoslav nationalities, to meet its end.

Jan Pieklo's article serves as a reminder that, no matter how tempting or how difficult it may be, a jounalist should never allow him/herself to be swayed by the majority opinion. The dignity and importance of the profession, in these trialing times, can be preserved only if one is prepared to walk alone.

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