Eurodialog - THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE

The future of Ukraine has a special meaning for Europe, since it may significantly influence the future of Russia and neighboring countries, the East-West relations, the expanding of the European Union and its relations with others countries of the region. Hence problems of this country, its past and perspectives for the future, require a deep understanding.

The starting point for all considerations is August 24, 1991, i.e. the declaration of independence, supported by 76 percent of the society. All consecutive, more or less significant steps have been a derivative of this decisive political choice of Ukraine. The year 1991 has not automatically solved everything, however it revealed that now Ukraine must define its language-, cultural-, political-, and international identity. "Orange revolution" became the slogan for the political orientation and acceleration of the transformation.

The balance of chances and dangers of the "post-revolutionary" Ukraine revealed itself during the parliamentary elections in March and during the process of creating a parliamentary majority. The government active since August, backed by a wide coalition, may become a great chance for Ukraine. If prime minister Janukovych, bound by the coalition agreement, shall keep the pro-Western attitude of the state, there is hope that this direction will become more acceptable to citizens living in the eastern provinces of the country.

The polarization of standpoints with respect to foreign and internal policy follows the general scheme: pro-European West versus pro-Russian East of the Ukraine; this polarization has deep historic, cultural and identity roots. In all of these domains Ukraine lacks cohesion, and the building of a common national and cultural identity is still an uncompleted process. It will take a very long time until the only official (constitutional) language - the Ukrainian - will become an everyday tool for the Russian-speaking eastern provinces, while attempts undertaken by local governments to formalize the status quo, i.e. the use of Russian when addressing the state administration, frequently interpreted as separatist echoes, result in Kiev's nervous reactions. ( During the times of the "Orange revolution" the East used to sinisterly scare with such separatist scenarios.) However, the Ukrainian intellectual elites are aware, that in the case of Ukraine language is not a determinant of patriotism. Extremely different are the ways in which history is perceived, which translates into commemoration of radically different heroes. The complicated religious situation is marked by the conflict between the Kiev and Moscow Orthodox Churches - the latter is Russia' means for political games; the third vector of the Orthodox Church - the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church - follows the Kiev patriarchate. Western Ukraine is a basis for Greek Catholic Church, traditionally associated with the national current. A political bringing together of the Kiev Orthodox, the Autocephalic and the Unitary Churches is currently observed, however in the religious domain the conflict of the Unitarians with the Orthodox Church is still vividly present.

The Russian factor is important in almost all dimensions creating the present, future, and, obviously, past of the Ukraine, which is most vividly illustrated by the dispute for the direct successor of the tradition of the Kiev Rus, and the (difficult for many Russians) acceptance of Ukrainians' distinctness and autonomy. A number of unsettled bilateral issues along with the pro-European and pro-NATO Kiev aspirations create recurring tensions. Russia's negative attitude toward democratic transformations of former Soviet republics and all forms of cooperation undertaken without Russia is well known. From the times of president Kuchma we remember the symptomatic balance between Russia and the West, based - in general - on returns under economic and political wings of Moscow in times of failures on the Western direction. In such circumstances Russia always warmly accepted Ukraine, while the West - declaring its support for Kiev's European aspirations - dedicated too little reflection to reasons underlying the pro-Russian turns.

Today Ukraine clearly defines its priorities, which results in struggles on three fronts: for Brussels's favor, for Moscow's neutral understanding and for the legitimization of pro-Western policy by the society. This is difficult, since the authorities are constantly subject to the temptation of the multi-vector policy, i.e. the simultaneous deepening of bonds with Russia and the West.

Once Poland recognized Ukraine's independence, the country accepted specific obligations. For a long time we learned to understand Ukraine, particularly difficult was the overcoming of phantoms from the past, a past a number of times marked by bloody Polish-Ukrainian conflicts. The support Polish society offered Ukrainians during the times of the "Orange revolution" obliges to further steps. Today they are of educational dimension: in the East we teach western standards, while teaching the EU understanding of Ukraine and its European aspirations.
Grzegorz Demel