Part One
I. Of course, questions of the borders of Europe make us think of the relationship between Europe and the physical space. This relationship has its complications and peculiarities. Before we start pondering some of these peculiarities we have to recall – although it may strain some readers’ patience – that ‘Europe’ can mean many different things. We should distinguish: (1) the Europe of the geographers; (2) Europe understood as the product of a long historical process that affects all aspects of human life; (3) Europe as a set of paradigmatic, ‘truly’ European states (usually France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands are meant; (4) Europe as a community of ideas and attitudes, that is, Europe as a cultural community; (5)Europe as a set of the most general postulates defining its ‘essence’ or true nature, which has been only partially expressed in actual European history and culture; and finally (6) Europe understood as the subject and the object of the European integration, presently the European Union.
The relationship between ‘Europe’ and space is in each case different and gives rise to different difficulties when an attempt to describe it somewhat more precisely is made.

II. The easiest case seems to be the first one: after all, geographers should be able to tell us where one of the continents lies. Unfortunately, although the conventional wisdom of the geographers has stopped at the Ural Mountains as the eastern border separating Europe from Asia, more adequate, in many respects, seems to be the bon mot of the poet [Here is the relevant passage from Paul Valéry (his question is still ours): « L’Europe deviendra-t-elle ce qu’elle est en réalité, c’est-à-dire un petit cap du continent asiatique ? Ou bien l’Europe restera-t-elle ce qu’elle parait, c’est-à-dire: la partie précieuse de l’univers terrestre, la perle de la sphère, le cerveau d’un vaste corps ? » Quoted after: Denis de Rougemont, Ecrits sur l’Europe, Paris 1994, vol. 1, p. 506.] who tells us that Europe is just a promontory of Asia. The further we move away from that promontory character of the European continent, the more numerous become the Asian features of the climate, vegetation and other characteristics that geographers describe.

III. Difficulties of another kind arise when we wish to describe the relationship between ‘Europe’ understood as ‘history in the making’, and its product, and the space where this history takes place. An important part of this history is the gradual formation of Europe as a cultural community. We say ‘part’ because the history of Europe is much more than just the history of its culture. If European culture originates in the culture of ancient Greece, in Judaic culture which is so important for Christianity, and in Rome with all its extended provinces, we have to grant that European history began outside Europe: in Asia or Northern Africa. Europe is hardly imaginable without the Biblical prophets, without Jesus Christ and the apostles, without the Alexandrian scholars and the Fathers of the Desert, without St. Augustine who was born in North Africa and was bishop there.

This, and the fact that the ancient forefathers of today’s Europeans had not yet entered the stage of history – although their attacks against the limes were becoming more menacing to the Empire – incline some historians to think that the history proper of Europe began much later, when the undoubtedly European lands had been conquered by the victorious barbarians who then started their own history.

This is, the view of, for example, Jacques Le Goff. In spite of the interrogative form of the title of his book on the right historical understanding of Europe L’Europe est-elle née au Moyen Age? from the very first page on he leaves no doubt that it is in the Middle Ages that Europe was born. Only the question of exactly when the birth occurred remains open. Some historians think that the moment of the final fall of the Roman Empire inaugurates European history. There are others who contend that that fall brought only the possibility of the beginning of Europe, but that Europe, as matter of fact, began later. When exactly?

Some regard the empire of Charlemagne as the first truly European creation. This view had been popularised by Leopold Ranke, a German historian of the 19th century. The trouble is that Charlemagne’s notion of Europe was rather vague, not very different from St. Augustine’s as depicted in Civitas Dei.

Others, Le Goff is one of them, [Cf. Jacques Le Goff, L’Europe es-elle née au Moyen Age, Paris 2003.] regard the formation of Europe as a long process rather than an event or short series of events. This process reaches its final stage owing to the confluence of various factors and circumstances such as the spread of Christianity, the rise of the cities and towns with free urban populations, the formation of the feudal, hierarchical structure of society, the development of commerce, the establishment of universities. La belle Europe of the cities, cathedrals, universities, chevaliers and troubadours was preceded by a number of attempts that failed in the 8th to 10th centuries (L’Europe avortée).

When Christian Europe finally came of age around the 13th century its relationship with the space of the geographers was marked by another complication – that of the split into Western and Eastern Europe: from 1054, Christianitas was divided in such a way that the Eastern, Orthodox part began to realise its own pattern of development. This division would greatly affect the way Eastern Europeans, especially Russians, interpret themselves. In these countries, in Russia above all, social and political thinking, literary culture and religion would hinge on questions that revolve round ‘us’ and ‘them’, that is, differences and similarities between East and West or Russia and Western Europe. The positions and orientations that arose from the perennial Russian controversies and discussions back then are important even now; they shape the course of Russian general reflections, and internal polemics, and Russia’s international politics.[ See e.g. Nicholas Rzevsky, Modern Russian Culture, Cambridge 1998.]

The relationship of Europe, understood as a historical process and its product, to space became even more complicated when, in the epoch of geographical discoveries and colonial expansion, Europe exerted economic, political and cultural influence on nearly the entire globe. Of course, the globe did not become Europe, but it became Europeanised to a considerable extent. It should be borne in mind that the largest democracy – India – owes its political institutions and structures to the European influence and models. Such traces and legacies of Europe are many. The ‘overseas’ components of the ‘West’- the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – are above all emanations of Europe.

IV. Paradoxically, the rise of the European powers made more visible the inner divisions of Europe. England as the ruler of oceans and the centre of the global empire kept the Continent at arm’s length; Spain was much more interested in its overseas provinces than in common European affair; Russia found in its huge territorial gains another confirmation of its special role and position, and felt itself strengthened in its search for the unique ‘Russian word’; France was also the capital of a separate entity, later to be called, francophonie, rather than just an element of the small cape of Europe.

This, and a certain cultural and political asynchrony of the development of the main European countries, resulted in a queer fact: the Europeans of the 18th and 19th centuries had trouble distinguishing which countries were authentically European. From Voltaire, the author of Lettres philosophiques, we learn that England rather than France is the only country that deserves this qualification. The British in the turn enjoyed their insularity. The Germans of the 19th century regarded themselves as a latecomer nation (verspaetete Nation) that had very little in common with the rest of Europe. As late as during the First World War Thomas Mann wrote in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen that the role of the Germans was to resist the Roman and classical elements of Europe. He shared that view with Dostoyevski who saw in protest the constitutive principle of Germany. In a similar vein, young Ortega y Gasset discussed with his colleagues the question of whether Spain was part of Europe or rather a special cultural and political entity.

As we see, the sense of insularity is by no means a uniquely British phenomenon. Similar intellectual and emotional attitudes are to be found in various periods of the history of Spain, Germany, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Habsburg Austria and even France. All these nations saw themselves, at some moments at least, as something special, exceptional, endowed with a special mission that justified partial or even total opposition to the rest of Europe. One should not be mislead by the diversity of formulations: some would say “we are so different that actually we are no more Europeans”; others would rather pretend “we are the only Europeans”. These formulations are just faces of the same coin.

V. Another sense of Europe is the notion that Europe is to be defined by its cultural and cultural achievements and not by the changing fates of political or social history. Europe in this sense is the land of literature.[ See: Denis de Rougemont, Ecrits sur l’Europe, Paris 1994, vol. II, pp. 173-177: Vingt languages et une literature]. Here were invented various literary form and styles that are typically European, that is, unknown anywhere else. Europe is the birthplace of classical music, specific architecture and sculpture; it is the place where emotions and feelings are experienced and expressed in special ways. Europe is the continent where the dignity of the individual is highly valued, as are such individual virtues as honour, courage, moral courage, and individual conscience.

Europe is also the only place where natural curiosity bore as its fruit science – a method of systematic search for truth in matters not of direct practical interest. Science combined with the ingenuity of its practical applications resulted in technology, which became the driving force of a previously unknown type of civilisation. As one author has put it, the invention of invention itself was of decisive importance for Europe’s stance in the world at large.[ See on that: Giovanni Reale, Radici culturali e spirituali dell’Europa, Milano 2003 and Chantal Millon-Delsol, L’Irréverence. Essai sur l’esprit européen, Edition Mame, s.l., 1993]

VI. This kind of more or less descriptive reflection upon the most characteristic features of Europe as a cultural entity should be distinguished from yet another kind of reflection. Its subject matter is restricted to the basic axiological decisions that supplied Europe, and especially its culture, with its foundations. One way of looking at these foundations may be rendered by saying that these foundations are given by a set of postulates or ideas that define the main task or, in loftier language, the vocation of Europe.

Usually three sources of these basic axiological decisions are pointed to: Greek philosophy with its discovery of the highest values – goodness, beauty and truth – and with the notion of the human being as someone who searches for these values and tries to realise them; the juridical culture of Rome with its basic idea of the rule of law; and Christianity, the religion that regards human beings as endowed with equal dignity which should be equally respected. There are some who, like, for example, Edmund Husserl, [Cf. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phänomenologie, Haag 1976, p. 325.] find the basis of the European vocation in the Greek conception of man as someone who engages in the search for ‘infinite ideas’, that is, ‘infinite truth’, ‘true values’ (wahre Werte), ‘authentic goods’ (echte Gueter) and ‘’absolutely’ valid norms’ (‘absolut’ gueltige Normen). [Cf: Rocco Buttiglione, Jarosław Merecki, Europa jako pojęcie filozoficzne, Lublin 1993.]

VII. The main point to be made with respect to the last two meanings of ‘Europe’ is simple but fundamental: Europe as a cultural community and Europe as the discoverer of the highest values knows no limits and no borders. The classics of European literature are read in South Africa and in Vladyvostok. Beethoven and Chopin belong to the repertoire of the concert halls in Japan and Australia. The highest values appeal not only to Europeans because their very essence makes this appeal universal.

As we see, answers to the simple question: “where is Europe?” range over quite a considerable spectrum: there is the answer that Europe cannot be found in any of those European countries that are considered to be European par excellence such as Great Britain, Germany or Spain; and there is the answer that because of the huge impact of European culture and civilisation on the rest of the world and because of the universality of the highest values Europe subscribes to, Europe is ubiquitous; and there are many other answers in between.

Part two
VIII. Europe understood as the European Union also has its history. Part of that history is the sequence of enlargements from the original six to the present twenty-five members. This process of territorial growth is nearing some barriers, prompting us to ask the questions concerning the borders of Europe. What is usually meant is the question of how far the further enlargements should go.

The answers depend, of course, on the conception of what Europe is and what it should be. And the variety of standpoints is again quite impressive: one extreme represents the thesis that Europe should not have any borders, the other that Europe should become Festung Europa. And there are many positions in between.

The first position is put forward by adherents of the liberal conception of European integration. No constraints on the free interplay of economic forces and actors, enhancement of competitiveness on global markets, removal of the obstacles that deform the results of the economic game (one such obstacle was the so-called ‘social market economy’, soziale Marktwirtschaft) – if all that is our goal, then given the fact that the world economy has already entered the phase of globalisation, there is no reason why European integration should be limited by any a priori defined territorial barriers. The liberal system of the integrated European market should be enlarged and gradually submerged into the global liberal system which, of course, will reject all borders and barriers. [See on that:Krzysztof Szczerski, Integracja europejska. Cywilizacja i polityka, Kraków 2003, pp. 9-28.]

For different reasons, the borders of integrated Europe are rejected by those who put forth a post-modern interpretation of the European Union. Many post-modern authors welcome the EU as the embodiment of all the things dear to these authors. One of the basic tenets of post-modernism is the declaration that the time of the great meta-narratives, including the meta-narratives of the nation states, has come to an end. The end of meta-narratives means that the oppressive character of great communities – national communities are meant in the first place – is no more tolerated. Instead, the individuals, the small local or regional communities that make possible authentic exchanges between individuals, are appreciated. A whole series of other notions that used to serve as means of the oppression is called in question. Unmasking the state means that ‘sovereignty’, ‘territoriality’, ‘national identity’, ‘closedness’ and the notion of ‘border’ itself should also be discarded. All that is opposed by post-modern openness, multiculturalism, the multitude of freely chosen life styles, and general tolerance. Rejection of the very notion of ‘border’ implies that the dichotomy ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘us’ and ‘others’ or ‘foreigners’, loses its grip on us.

Without entering into the technicalities of the expected transformation, the post-modern admirers of the EU express the hope that the processes initiated in Europe will reach and transform the entire world, which will succumb to the attractiveness of European ‘soft power’. The oppressive power of sovereign national states, the lure of great narratives and great communities, the hierarchical structures of centralised powers will finally disappear. The obsolete international order will be abandoned and replaced by the ‘chaotic order’.

There are two models of this ‘chaotic order’. One is the internet – the instrument that allows the creation of communities above and beyond any physical borders. Another one is the bazaar – an arena of unimpeded contacts and exchanges, where anyone may present his offer to everyone.

As feminism is an important component of post-modernism, feminist theory of European integration cannot be missing. In general, the ‘feminist turn’ involves adding an extra dimension to post-modern unmasking. All the main ideas that post-modernism questions – the state with its borders which should be guarded and defended, sovereignty, national community, collective identity - turn out to be outgrowths of male domination. The same goes for the whole rest of the masculine repertoire, and especially the masculine virtues: honour, courage, efficiency and rationality. Fortunately, the end of masculine dominion is already in view. The entire world is about to adopt European ‘soft power’ as the avant-garde of the coming ‘chaotic order’ which will mean the end of sexist international politics.

IX. Further conceptions concerning the borders of European integration do not reject the notion of ‘border’; but they differ as to the starting point of their respective argumentation; and we can expect them to differ also as to the details of how the borders should be drawn. [Cf. Fabrice Fries, Les grand débats européens, Paris 1995.]

According to one of these conceptions European integration should aim at transforming the European Union into a uniform, state-like structure endowed with a parliament elected in general European elections, with a government, independent judicial system, and president. This structure should define and realise a common foreign policy and also a common defence policy. Although the representatives of this conception are not quite explicit about the scope of European integration, one can surmise that the borders of the European state would reflect the long-term interest of that state. What would count in this view is well known: striking the right balance between various influences, inter-state cooperation and competition, and the share of the peace dividend the European state might hope for.

Another conception of European integration regards the European Union as union of nation-states as we know them today. The main task and meaning of such a union is to use the common structures to promote the interests of each nation-state. It is assumed that that the common structures are simply more efficient means of such promotion. The European Union would then mean continuation of the usual political game in Europe but, to apply Clausewitz’s formula, mit anderen Mitteln. The novelty of the EU would then consist only in the realisation that the common structures should be supported because they are in everyone’s interests. In fact, nothing really new, as the old adage: “l’union fait la force” shows. This position implies that the scope of the EU and its borders should depend on the interests not of one single European state but of each and every member state.

This conception is sometimes modified in such a way that the EU should be instrumental in the realisation of the interests primarily of some rather than all members. The composition of that group is far from clear: ‘the founding members’, the ‘Franco-German engine of the EU’, the ‘hard core’ are some of the possibilities that surface in various debates. The consequences of that stance for the question of borders are twofold. First, the exact demarcation should be a function of the interests of that smaller ‘club’. And second, inner divisions would ensue: borders that would separate the ‘club’ from the rest of the EU members.
Europe as the European fortress (Festung Europa) is being postulated on still different grounds. The main insight of those who plead for it is “Europe is in danger”. What is menacing is either Islam or the poor South or the indefinite wave of Asian (or Eastern) immigrants, or all these factors together. This diagnosis is followed by the postulate that the borders of Europe should be rather restrictive, taken seriously, and carefully watched, and if need arises bravely defended. A modicum of courage is what the Europeans should display. A fervent plea for this position is to be found in recent publications of O. Fallaci. [Oriana Fallaci, La forza della Ragione, New York 2004.]

X. How to choose the right solution?

Here are some points that might be helpful:
First, basic facts should be taken into account. One of them is that Europe has succeeded in the integrative enterprise not only through its own efforts and cunning but also due to the coincidence of favourable circumstances (the military umbrella of the US was one of these). That success has once again given Europe the possibility of assuming a global role.

Second, this situation elicits justified expectations: the rest of the world hopes that an integrated Europe will also become a global player politically in spite of some rather discouraging experiences (cf. the Balkans or some regions of Africa, where European countries, insisting on their military presence, failed to prevent political and humanitarian catastrophes).

Third, the political vacuum that will appear if Europe fails to resume its global role will be filled in by others. China and India are the obvious candidates.

In the light of what has been said, the perspective from which Europe should redefine its role and decide on its borders becomes quite evident. On the one hand, these key decisions have to flow from the realisation that the present situation imposes on Europe quite a considerable part of the responsibility for the way the main global problems will be faced and solved. The present role of a more or less irresponsible observer and critic of others will not be enough. After a while, Europe, if its present position remains unchanged, will be on the margin of world politics. On the other hand, taking the appropriate share of responsibility is a duty that Europe has imposed upon itself. This duty is grounded in centuries of European global politics, in the European culture that Europe brought to different parts of the world, and in those basic values that the Greeks and the Christians discovered for Europe and for the world. A very special ground of this duty is to be found in the recent history of Europe, a history of totalitarian experiments, of world wars, of the export of revolutions and virulent nationalisms. That is how Europe became a debtor to the rest of the world. It is high time to pay back the debts.

The problem of how to draw the demarcation lines between the EU and rest of the world may find its solution only in that perspective. In a sense it is a problem of secondary importance. Nor is it so important whether the eventual borders will be borders in the strict sense or rather a fuzzy area that will include various kinds of arrangements with the immediate neighbourhood of Europe. More important is whether Europe will be able to face its challenge and perceive the chance it is given.

The main difficulty is that in Europe, facing all these challenges and being about to take all these fundamental decisions, no one seems to be ready to accept this perspective. The politicians declare that they are.[ Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, La Constitution pour l’ Europe, Paris 2003, pp. 9-77.]. However, at any somewhat difficult juncture they usually prefer to assume the posture of guardians of national interests. The general public hesitates between taking nationalistic positions and seeking the benefits that social welfare states are expected to produce. And the intellectuals tend to reject the language of values, obligations and responsibility as the obsolete idiom of modern oppression. They escape into the paradise of the post-modern moral and political patchwork.

The sooner this changes the better for Europe, the better for the world.

Czesław Porębski, april 2005